Comments on: Science as Social Construct http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/ Pensaments of an Anthropological Patzer Tue, 06 Jan 2009 13:37:24 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.5.1 By: Bob Offer-Westort http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-32 Bob Offer-Westort Tue, 12 Jul 2005 21:02:21 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-32 Okay. Thanks to the young battleaxe's suffering a war wound, yesterday, I didn't get much sleep, last night. During her tossing and turning, I spent a lot of time thinking about this problem, and, at the end of the night, I'm still not terribly certain. Here's what I'm leaning toward: Good science is composed of representations of representations of real, observable objects and processes. Our understandings of observations may differ, personally and culturally, but while the <span lang="de">für uns</span> may vary, any non-nihilist would agree dat <span lang="de">das ding</span> is dere. Because we're working with real things, good science may be falsifiable (<span lang="fr">à la</span> Popper) by others of <em>any</em> theoretical persuasion. A vedāntin may tell you that the keyboard in front of you is māyā, and a Buddhist may call it a dharma, but the object is <em>still</em> tangibly there — to my knowledge, both of these philosophies recognise varying domains of experience and language, and would recognise the keyboard as relevant for quotidian life, and for dealing with concepts like velocity and water displacement. While cultures (or, more usually, subsections of cultures) may give varying weight to material reality, I believe we all encounter it the same (which is not to say that we experience it the same). Now, theories like natural selections and evolutionary psychologies <em>cannot</em> be falsified, and here I don't know whether or not I differ from Popper. Theories of this sort are supported or rejected not because they can or cannot be falsified, but because of their interpretive value. Nevertheless, they must have some material underpinnings <em>as they have to have something to interpret</em>. Gould explains extremely well the material underpinnings for Darwinian Natural Selection. I don't know any specific evolutionary psychological theories as well as I should. Now, while Al. et Havlicek's findings could easily be falsified, the root problem that makes their science bad is that their conclusions are not drawn from material roots (with culture-tinted observations), but from <span lang="la">a priori</span>, culturally-acquired ideas, starting with the very concept of dominance/narcissism, composed of a number of not-self-evidently-related characteristics, determined by questionable means, continuing with the rating of qualities deemed important by the scientists, but not necessarily so by the group under study, and finally by using statistical methods on such a small population that the presentation of the data can hardly be considered statistical at all, but is something of the authors' own invention, based on statistics (which, itself, is composed largely of cultural assumptions, albeit widely-accepted ones). I think. Okay. Thanks to the young battleaxe’s suffering a war wound, yesterday, I didn’t get much sleep, last night. During her tossing and turning, I spent a lot of time thinking about this problem, and, at the end of the night, I’m still not terribly certain. Here’s what I’m leaning toward: Good science is composed of representations of representations of real, observable objects and processes. Our understandings of observations may differ, personally and culturally, but while the für uns may vary, any non-nihilist would agree dat das ding is dere. Because we’re working with real things, good science may be falsifiable (à la Popper) by others of any theoretical persuasion. A vedāntin may tell you that the keyboard in front of you is māyā, and a Buddhist may call it a dharma, but the object is still tangibly there — to my knowledge, both of these philosophies recognise varying domains of experience and language, and would recognise the keyboard as relevant for quotidian life, and for dealing with concepts like velocity and water displacement. While cultures (or, more usually, subsections of cultures) may give varying weight to material reality, I believe we all encounter it the same (which is not to say that we experience it the same).

Now, theories like natural selections and evolutionary psychologies cannot be falsified, and here I don’t know whether or not I differ from Popper. Theories of this sort are supported or rejected not because they can or cannot be falsified, but because of their interpretive value. Nevertheless, they must have some material underpinnings as they have to have something to interpret. Gould explains extremely well the material underpinnings for Darwinian Natural Selection. I don’t know any specific evolutionary psychological theories as well as I should.

Now, while Al. et Havlicek’s findings could easily be falsified, the root problem that makes their science bad is that their conclusions are not drawn from material roots (with culture-tinted observations), but from a priori, culturally-acquired ideas, starting with the very concept of dominance/narcissism, composed of a number of not-self-evidently-related characteristics, determined by questionable means, continuing with the rating of qualities deemed important by the scientists, but not necessarily so by the group under study, and finally by using statistical methods on such a small population that the presentation of the data can hardly be considered statistical at all, but is something of the authors’ own invention, based on statistics (which, itself, is composed largely of cultural assumptions, albeit widely-accepted ones).

I think.

]]> By: scribe http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-31 scribe Tue, 12 Jul 2005 00:06:40 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-31 Okay, but isn't <em>all</em> science cultural? I mean, you don't make observations without doing so in some cultural framework, and the paradigms in which science is created are necessarily cultural. If that's the case, then is it really the social construction of this science that makes it bad? Or does that, perhaps, mean that it's not bad at all — just cultural, like all science? Okay, but isn’t all science cultural? I mean, you don’t make observations without doing so in some cultural framework, and the paradigms in which science is created are necessarily cultural. If that’s the case, then is it really the social construction of this science that makes it bad? Or does that, perhaps, mean that it’s not bad at all — just cultural, like all science?

]]> By: Bob Offer-Westort http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-30 Bob Offer-Westort Mon, 11 Jul 2005 20:12:25 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-30 What I'm saying is that the conclusions were made in advance, and that the hokum science was invented in order to support those beliefs. It becomes the same as any other faith-based belief system, like religion. The "scientists" hold beliefs for various cultural reasons, and then rationalise these beliefs. This sort of "science" is a cultural artefact, and shouldn't be given any greater credence than other cultural systems. Being cultural doesn't necessarily make it <em>wrong</em> — it just means that it doesn't deserve the authority we usually grant science. What I’m saying is that the conclusions were made in advance, and that the hokum science was invented in order to support those beliefs. It becomes the same as any other faith-based belief system, like religion. The “scientists” hold beliefs for various cultural reasons, and then rationalise these beliefs. This sort of “science” is a cultural artefact, and shouldn’t be given any greater credence than other cultural systems. Being cultural doesn’t necessarily make it wrong — it just means that it doesn’t deserve the authority we usually grant science.

]]> By: scribe http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-29 scribe Mon, 11 Jul 2005 20:06:02 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-29 I get that this is bad science. I don't get how this shows that science is a social construct. I mean, I'm aware of work in the anthropology of science, and this ain't it. What are you saying with your title? I get that this is bad science. I don’t get how this shows that science is a social construct. I mean, I’m aware of work in the anthropology of science, and this ain’t it. What are you saying with your title?

]]> By: Bob Offer-Westort http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-28 Bob Offer-Westort Mon, 11 Jul 2005 19:21:37 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-28 The more I think about this study (I had really hoped that blogging would get it out of my system), the more my brain hurts: By what mechanism do they suppose a woman's <em>body</em> knows she's in a relationship? How could that <em>not</em> be a social, rather than an evolved physical, response? On what grounds do they assume that the men with whom these women are already involved are weak-willed providers, rather than genetically superior (whatever that means), psychologically dominant, jackass Übermenschen? If their theory held, wouldn't there likely be a certain portion of spoken-for ovulatrices who were especially turned on by the under-arm odour of sensitive new-age guys? The more I think about this study (I had really hoped that blogging would get it out of my system), the more my brain hurts: By what mechanism do they suppose a woman’s body knows she’s in a relationship? How could that not be a social, rather than an evolved physical, response? On what grounds do they assume that the men with whom these women are already involved are weak-willed providers, rather than genetically superior (whatever that means), psychologically dominant, jackass Übermenschen? If their theory held, wouldn’t there likely be a certain portion of spoken-for ovulatrices who were especially turned on by the under-arm odour of sensitive new-age guys?

]]> By: Bob Offer-Westort http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-27 Bob Offer-Westort Mon, 11 Jul 2005 05:58:02 +0000 http://www.pathawi.net/b-log/2005/07/10/science-as-social-construct/#comment-27 It has been brought to my attention that <em>Clark Kent and Superman are in fact the same person</em>. Bad analogy — I missed the memo. Mea culpa. It has been brought to my attention that Clark Kent and Superman are in fact the same person. Bad analogy — I missed the memo. Mea culpa.

]]>